Abstract. Jan Kraj cek posed the following problem: Is there is a generalization result in the theory of real closed elds of the form: If A(1 + + 1) (n occurrences of 1) is provable in length k for all n 2 !, then (8x)A(x) is provable? It is argued that the answer to this question depends on the particular formulation of the \theory of real closed elds." Four distinct formulations are investigated with respect to their generalization behavior. It is shown that there is a positive answer to Kraj cek's question for (1) the axiom system RCF of Artin{Schreier with Gentzen's LK as underlying logical calculus, (2) RCF with the variant LKB of LK allowing introduction of several quanti ers of the same type in one step, (3) LKB and the rst-order schemata corresponding to Dedekind cuts and the supremum principle. A negative answer is given for (4) any system containing the schema of extensionality.
Introduction
In 5], Jan Kraj cek posed the following problem, inspired by a similar problem for Peano Arithmetic known as Kreisel This and similar problems deal with the concept of short proofs, i.e., proofs of theorems in a xed number of steps, in various circumstances, namely relative to di erent axiom systems and relative to di erent formulations of the underlying deductive system for rst-order classical logic. Results in the literature indicate that questions about generalizations like the above problem provide a way to distinguish between di erent proof systems for one and the same theory, i.e., to distinguish between formulations which are indistinguishable by model theoretic properties.
For our present purposes, we rst consider the usual system of axioms for real closed elds arising from the algebraic analysis of Artin and Schreier 1]. These are quanti ed equality axioms (not the equality schema), the (purely universal) axioms for ordered elds, plus (8x)(9y) We also add all instances of the following equality axioms: x = y p jxj = p jyj x = y h 2n+1 (x 0 ; : : :; x; : : :; x 2n ) = h 2n+1 (x 0 ; : : :; y; : : :; x 2n ) Generalization results are usually investigated for number theories. The principal interest of Kraj cek's question lies in the fact that RCF has properties which number theories do not have, viz., it is complete, and it admits elimination of quanti ers. So what can be said about RCF w.r.t. generalization of theorems using only these properties?
One consequence of quanti er elimination for RCF is the following observation: If A(x 0 ) is true for a su ciently large x 0 , then (8x x 0 )A(x) is true. By quanti er elimination, A(x) is equivalent to a quanti er free A 0 (x) which is a disjunction of conjunctions of polynomial equalities and inequalities. For x 0 su ciently large and the leading coe cient of p i positive, formulas of the form p i (x 0 ) = 0 and p i (x 0 ) < 0 will certainly be false. So at least one disjunct must be of the form V p j (x) > 0, where the leading coe cient of every p j is positive. But if p j (x 0 ) > 0 holds, then it holds for all x x 0 . In fact, the rst such x 0 can be computed from A(x).
A second observation is the following: Take the open extension RCF op : If A(t) is provable for every variable-free term t (in the extended language), then (8x)A(x) is provable. This holds, by completeness, because (8x)A(x) is true in the standard model of algebraic numbers.
These two observations put Kraj cek's question in perspective: By the second observation, the question would be trivial if instead of the sums of 1's one would ask for all terms. So the decisive aspect is which subsets of the set of terms are considered for the generalization problem. A more glaring distinction between terms and their values will be given in the next section, where we show that all in nite sequences of sums of 1's (and even of 0's) generalize, but there are sequences of terms with the values of all (natural) numbers which do not.
We give four answers to Kraj cek's question, three positive and one negative: The generalization result holds for (1) The method used to obtain the results is to reduce the structure of the proofs to their Herbrand disjunctions. In fact, we want to generalize theorems and not proofs per se. One can, however, view the generalization of theorems as a borderline case of generalization of proofs, namely where every sound transformation of a proof is permitted. In a sense then, generalization of theorems has a similar relation to generalization of proofs as model theory has to to proof theory.
Calculi, terms, uni cation
In the course of this paper we shall work with two logical calculi: The rst one is Gentzen's 7] sequent calculus for classical logic LK. The de nition of this system we use is standard. The choice of LK over other, in particular, Hilberttype calculi has no bearing on our results, since LK and these systems simulate each other (polynomially in the length of the proof; cf. 6], 7]).
For the de nition of LK and basic terminology, see 12] . One convention should be explicitly pointed out: Free and bound variables are treated as syntactically distinct. They are denoted by a, b, etc., and x, y, etc., respectively. A semi-term may contain bound variables, a term contains only free variables. Similarly, a semi-formula may contain bound variables only if they are in the scope of a binding quanti er. For instance, (8x)A(x) contains the semi-formula A(x) which is not a formula. As might be expected, by A(a) we denote the formula obtained from A(x) by replacing x by a wherever x does not occur in the scope of a binding quanti er. The convention about free and bound variables is often very convenient (e.g., we do not have to worry about terms being substitutable for variables in a formula). When speaking in general terms about substitutions, etc., we will use letters from the end of the alphabet to denote either kind of variable. It will be clear from the context whether x stands for a bound variable or any variable at all. If a de nition or a statement applies equally to terms and semi-terms, we drop the pre x \semi." LK-Block ( 9 . The variables a 1 , : : :, a n in (8 B :right) and (9 B :left) must be distinct and satisfy the eigenvariable condition. The case n = 0 is allowed; an actual block quanti er inference with n = 0 is called improper.
The calculus LK B was introduced in 4], where its k-provability problem was investigated. LK and LK B are obviously equivalent in terms of provability; any block quanti er inference can be replaced by a sequence of usual quanti er inferences.
Proofs in LK and LK B are upward rooted trees of sequents. We de ne the length len( ) of a proof (also: its number of steps) as the number of applications of inference rules (of the respective calculus) with the exception of the exchange rule.
Given a set of formulas (a theory) T, we say that T derives a formula A, in occurrence of s in t, and the length of the path from the outermost function symbol of s to the root of t in T(t) is n. For instance, (1 + x) occurs at depth 1 in 1 + (1 + x). The depth dp(t) of a term is the length of the longest path in T(t). The logical depth ld(A) of a formula A is the length of the longest path in T(A 0 ) where A 0 is the term corresponding to A in the propositional term language. The logical depth of a sequent is the maximum logical depth of a formula in it.
De nition2.4. A uni cation problem U is a set of pairs of terms. The depth of U is the maximum depth of a term occurring in it: dp(U) = maxfdp(s); dp(t) j hs; ti The variable x disappears, and the depths of all other variables remain the same.
Case (2): x does not only occur at depth 0. If s happens to be a variable, the term depth of U 0 equals the term depth of U. If s occurs only at depth 0, then after replacing x by s, s does also occur at depth > 0 in U 0 , i.e., v 0 = v and dp(U 0 ) = dp(U). So assume s is not a variable occurring only at depth 0. We have v 0 = v ? 1 and dp(U 0 ) 2 dp(U). Let 0 be a most general uni er for U 0 .
By induction hypothesis, dp(U 0 0 ) 2 v?1 dp(U 0 ). The most general uni er of U produced by the algorithm is = 0 fs 7 ! xg, and U 0 0 = U . Hence, dp(U ) 2 v?1 2 dp(U) = 2 v dp(U). 2 De nition2.6. A congruence uni cation problem over a propositional term language is a pair hU; Ci where:
(2) C is a set of sets of pairs hp; Ai, where p is a propositional variable, and A is a semi-formula. For every variable p there is exactly one A and X s.t.
hp; Ai 2 X 2 C. Hence, C de nes a partition of the variables in classes; the class p] C of a variable p is the one set X 2 C s.t. hp; Ai We introduce k`new variables r 1i , : : :, r`i (1 i k) and form k variabledisjoint copies t 1 , : : :, t k of t by: t i = t r 1i =r 1 ; : : :; r`i=r`]. Now replace (everywhere in U) p by t and p i by t i , obtaining U 0 . We partition the set of variables of the resulting uni cation problem into C 0 by (1) marking the class p] C as removed and (2) setting r j ] C 0 = r j ] C fhr ji ; i (r j )i j 1 i kg.
By inspection, the above algorithm has the same termination properties as usual uni cation, and has the same bound for the depth of terms.
3 k-Provability for RCF w.r.t. LK reduces to k-provability of nite subtheories
The likely interpretation of Kraj cek's problem suggests a formulation of the theory of real closed elds in a usual logical inference system, such as Gentzen's sequent calculus LK.
An early result of Parikh shows that the logical complexity of formulas in a proof (in LK) can be bounded by a function depending on k and the end-sequent.
The argument, in modern presentation, uses uni cation on the skeleton of the proof of, say, T ! A. We can extend this result in our setting to show that the logical complexity of formulas in a proof of a formula A in RCF can be bounded by a function depending on k and A alone. In particular, any proof of A in k steps need only use a xed number (depending on k and the logical structure of 6 A) of axioms (zro 2n+1 ). In e ect then, we are working in a nite axiom system. For nite axiom systems, however, the generalization result always holds. In fact, a stronger statement is true: there is always a nite term basis. Recursively traverse the proof tree from the root upwards. At every inference, add appropriate term pairs to U and extend the partition C: (1) The inference is a weakening: Proceed. Clearly, itself de nes a congruence uni er for hU; Ci, via (p Bi ) = B (where B i is an occurrence of the semi-formula B in ). So hU; Ci has a solution. Let h ; C 0 i be a most general congruence uni er of hU; Ci. Write down the structure 0 obtained from by replacing every formula occurrence in by its corresponding propositional variable, and apply to it. Let t, t 1 , : : :, t n be those terms in the end sequent of 0 corresponding to A and A 1 , : : :, A n , respectively, where T = fA 1 ; : : :; A n g. Clearly, the resulting structure is indeed a proof. Furthermore, the number of variables in U which do not only occur at depth 0 is 2k (In the construction of U, at most 2 variables occurring at depth 1 were introduced per inference). By Lemma 2.5, the maximal logical depth of a formula in 0 is bounded above by`= 2 0 ; the length of 0 is k. 2 The reader can now see the motivation for the de nition of a congruence uni cation problem. The basic idea of the preceding proof is to rewrite the given proof in its most general form, so to speak, by replacing the formulas occurring in it by propositional variables. The uni cation problem de ned ensures that only connectives and quanti ers which must occur in the more general proof (because they are introduced at an inference rule) do occur. It rules out the possibility that a given end sequent could only be proved by introducing arbitrarily complex formulas in the axioms or using weakenings, which disappear in cuts elsewhere in the proof. Were we only dealing with propositional proofs, Parikh's result could be obtained using conventional uni cation. The slightly problematic case is that of the quanti er rules, where the auxiliary formula in the premise is not a literal sub-formula of the principal formula in the conclusion, but only modulo the term structure. Hence, we cannot use the same propositional variable for, say, B(t) and B(x). Congruence uni cation is designed to take care of that.
In what follows, we abbreviate the tuple x 1 , : : :, x n by x. De ne a uni cation problem as follows: Assume P(r 1 ; : : :; r m ) is an atomic formula in H, and let P i (u i1 ; : : :; u im ) be all corresponding atomic formulas in H 0 . Then set u ij = r j . In other words, equate two atomic formulas in H 0 if the corresponding formulas in H are identical. Clearly, this uni cation problem is solvable, since H de nes a solution. Hence there is a most general uni er . Furthermore, H 0 is a tautology for any substitution . Now let s = (x). H 0 is a propositional tautology, so T ! A(s ) is provable. Furthermore, the depth of s depends only on k and A(x). Also, s = s for some uni cation .
Starting from s s. A way to nd the term basis is writing down a semi-sequent of the form given by H 0 , and partitioning the atomic formulas with the same leading predicate symbol. If the uni cation problem arising from such a partition has a solution , H 0 is a propositional tautology, and (x) contains no Skolem functions, then (x) is an element of the term basis. A di erent method of obtaining the above result would be to use uni cation over a cut-free proof skeleton; cf. 8]. Its advantage is that the structure of the original proofs is not changed as drastically as in our approach (by cutelimination and skolemization); its disadvantage is, however, that it is prima facie much harder to calculate all realizable cut-free proof skeleta than it is to calculate all Herbrand disjunctions. We see that the generalization depends on the structure of the terms alone and not on their values, for the generalization result also holds for (1) the sequence f0g n and (2) any in nite subsequence of f1g n or f0g n . Still, it is an interesting question how far the relations between large terms and terms with large values go. We recapitulate a remark made in the introduction: If A(s) is true for terms s of su ciently large value, then it is true for all terms with larger value. This is in contrast to the following result, which holds in any number theory N strong enough to formalize Matiyasevi c's theorem, e.g., I 1 . Proposition3.6. A(a)^v(a; c) = a . By assumption there is, for true recursive A(a) and for each n, a solution g n to the Diophantine representation for A(a). De ne s n v(f1g n ; g n ). By de nition, s n has value n. Take for A(a) the formula :Prf(a; d0 = 1e), where Prf is a proof predicate for N. By the Incompleteness Theorem, (9y)(8x) ? x y A(x) cannot be provable. 2 
Introduction of blocks of quanti ers: Using zeroes of arbitrary polynomials
We have seen in the last section that generalization results hold for the theory of real closed elds, simply because in k steps an LK-proof can make use only of zeroes of polynomials with degree bounded in k. This, however, is counterintuitive. The length measure of a proof should take into account which, and how many axioms are used, in particular how many zeroes-of-polynomial axioms, but not the degree of the polynomials themselves. Any mathematician would feel equally entitled to the use of all axioms (zro 2n+1 ). One way to overcome this problem would be to replace (zro 2n+1 ) by the formulas (9y)y 2n+1 + t 2n y 2n + : : : + t 1 y + t 0 = 0, where the t i are arbitrary terms. This option has serious drawbacks, however. These instances of the zeroes axioms cannot be used in the familiar way to formulate lemmata etc. in a xed number of steps. In particular, not even (zro 2n+1 ) is provable in a xed length independent of n.
To do better justice to the above requirement, we can work, instead of in Consider the tree T of formula occurrences in with vertices the formula occurrences which give rise to A, and which are subformulas of A but not of (instances of) A 0 , and with an edge between B and B 0 if B gives rise to B 0 . This tree branches only at contractions, its leaves are either axioms, weakening formulas, or subformulas of A 0 , and if it contains the edge hB; B 0 i, then B = B 0 or B 0 is obtained from B by a (8:right) introduction. We now alter 0 as follows: Let a i , : : :, a n be new free variables. If (8x i ) : : :(8x n )A 00 is a leaf in an axiom, replace that axiom by A 000 ! A 000 (8x i ) : : :(8x n )A 00 ! A 000 8:left where A 000 = A 00 a i =x i ; : : :; a n =x n ]. In the graph T there are several vertices which are premises to bottommost (8:right) inferences, i.e., there are no other (8:right) inferences between them and the root A (there are essentially only contractions). Replace all occurrences of formulas in the subtrees ending in such vertices by A 0 b 1 =x 1 ; : : :; b n =x n ], and replace free variables as needed to obtain a correct proof. Change the bottommost (8:right) inferences so as to introduce the entire string (8x 1 ) : : :(8x n ); the other inferences are now improper. The eigenvariable condition for the bottommost 8-introductions are satis ed, since they were satis ed even already further above in the original proof. Now consider the case of A = (9x 1 ) : : :(9x n )A 0 occurring on the right side of some sequent, where the 9-string is again maximal, and de ne the graph T as above. Let a i , : : :, a n be new free variables. If (9x i ) : : :(9x n )A 00 is a leaf in an axiom, replace that axiom by A 000 ! A 000 A 000 ! (9x 1 ) : : :(9x n )A 0 9:right (9x i ) : : :(9x n )A 00 ! (9x 1 ) : : :(9x n )A 0 9:left where A 000 = A 00 a i =x i ; : : :; a n =x n ]. Then consider a topmost (9:right) inference in T: Replace all occurrences of formulas in T below this inference by A. This changes all (9:right) introductions below this topmost one to improper inferences. Since this is done on every branch, contractions are still correct. Eigenvariable conditions cannot be violated by this modi cation, since potential eigenvariables are only replaced by bound variables earlier in the proof.
Similar considerations apply to (9:left) and (8:left) . Note that the modi cation of axioms does not interfere with the modi cations for another occurrence of the same formula. After these modi cations have been performed, property (1) holds. Now delete all improper quanti er inferences and rename eigenvariables to obtain (2) and (3) 2 Theorem4.5. Let be a simple LK B -proof of length k of the sequent ? ! .
Then there is a proof 0 of ? ! with the same skeleton as , and the at depth of formulas occurring in 0 is bounded above by 2 k ld (? ! ). Proof. We proceed as in the proof of Theorem 3.2 with the following modi cations to accommodate the block quanti er inferences. We augment the propositional term language by second-order monadic quanti er variables of two types, denoted q 8 and q 9 . The uni cation problem is obtained from a simple proof, and so we can restrict the solutions so that (a) no two quanti er variables of the same kind immediately follow another, i.e., every quanti er variable corresponds to a maximal string of quanti ers of the same type, and (b) every quanti er variable has as a solution a non-empty string of quanti ers. The quanti er variables are uni ed as follows: (1) (1) and (2) are justi ed by (a) and (b) above (note that q Q (t) = q 0 Q (q 00 Q (s) cannot occur); and (b) justi es that|as (4) dictates|q 8 (t) = q 9 (t 0 ), q Q (t) = :s and q Q (t) = s s 0 ( 2 f^; _; g) do not unify. We construct a (monadic second-order) congruence uni cation problem U from in the propositional term language extended by q 8 and q 9 just like in the proof of Theorem 3.2. We only give the case of the block quanti er introductions: Clearly, the proof again de nes a solution to the congruence uni cation problem U. The uni cation algorithm terminates and gives a substitution of which is an instance; this is easily seen by inspection of the algorithm. As before, de ne 0 , mapping leftover propositional variables to a formula, say, (0 = 0). In addition, maps quanti er variables to the corresponding actual string of quanti ers in . For the at depth of , the same bound holds as for usual uni cation. 2 Lemma 4.6. Cut elimination holds for simple LK B -proofs, and the bound (w.r.t. ld ) for the cut-free proof is the same as for cut elimination in LK.
Proof. By inspection of the proof for LK. The critical step is the reduction of a cut formula which is introduced by two quanti er inferences. Since the proof is simple, the same quanti ers are introduced on the left and right side above the cut, and can be reduced as usual. Now consider the following depth measure for terms t in the language of RCF op . Color a branch in the term tree T(t) if it passes through a function symbol h 2n+1 for the zero of a polynomial. The at depth of an occurrence of a term s in t is the depth of s in t if t is not colored at all, 0 if s itself is colored, and otherwise the length of the uncolored part of the path from s to the root, minus 1. The at depth dp (t) of t is the maximum at depth of a constant or variable in t. For instance, in (1 + s 1 ) + h(1; s 2 ), s 1 occurs at depth 1, and s 2 occurs at depth 0.
By inspection of the proof of Lemma 2.5 we see that the same bound holds for the language of RCF op w.r.t. dp as for the ordinary term depth. As is easily seen, (1) the large terms above have at depth 0, in particular, all variables in them occur at at depth 0, and (2) dp(t) = dp (t) if t does not contain a symbol h 2n+1 . Hence, dp (x) is bounded above by a function depending only on k and A(x). We have dp (x) = dp (x), since s is a tuple of terms in the original language, and therefore does not contain h j . By the same argument as before we have a nite term basis for RCF. 2 Observe that here, however, the computation of the term basis is not e ective, since there are in nitely many possible Herbrand sequents (with the same at term depth but increasing real term depth). Furthermore, there are no term bases if the language is extended to include all the function symbols of RCF op . The following result holds nevertheless: Corollary4.9. RCF op has nite term bases w.r.t. LK B for terms from the language restricted to the language of RCF plus 
where B C (x) (8z) ? C(z) z x (x is an upper bound for C). We will see that all these schemata are equivalent in a strong sense, even if restricted to existential A and C: Whenever we can prove something with one of them in k steps, we can prove it with one of the other two in (k) step in LK B (not in LK, however). Proposition5.1. The axioms for ordered elds with (sqrt) plus (sup) with quanti er free C gives an axiomatization of the theory of real closed elds, denoted RCF sup .
Proof. It su ces to show that (sup) implies the existence of zeroes for every polynomial of odd degree. Take for C(x) p(x) < 0, where p(x) is a polynomial of odd degree. The hypotheses of (sup) are satis ed, so (sup) provides a least upper bound x 0 of C. It can be shown using the binomial theorem that if p(x 0 ) < 0 there is an > 0 s.t. p(x 0 + ) < 0 (so x 0 is not an upper bound) and that if Note that the arguments above can all be formalized schematically, and since we work in LK B , the length of the quanti er pre xes (9z) of C has no in uence on the proof length. Hence, the proof length is independent of C. 2 From the preceding proposition it follows that, for purposes of generalization, we need only consider one of the above schemata. We will restrict attention therefore to (sup 0 ), which has a striking similarity to the least number principle in number theory. We see that in this formulation, B C (x) is a purely universal formula. This form of (sup 0 ) is of the same form as L9 1 (but has an additional premise which does not interfere with the proof, and it contains universal instead of existential formulas). 2 In summary, the same generalization results hold for RCF sup as for RCF, in particular, Kraj cek's question has a positive answer. It does not follow, however, that the axioms of RCF are derivable in a xed number of steps from (sup). 6 Generalization fails for extensionality 7 
Conclusion
All our results relate to theories of speci c syntactic forms, which the formulations of the real closed elds we have considered also have. The importance of these results for the theories of real closed elds themselves is that they give information about the relationship between proofs and computations. We give a simple example: If Kraj cek's question can be answered positively for T, then it is not possible to quickly distinguish between unequal numbers (i.e., T does not prove f1g n 6 = f1g m for n 6 = m, uniformly within a xed number of steps). The schema (ext) is strong enough for this sort of decision (cf. Proposition 6.5), just like number theories including successor induction A(0)^(8x) ? A(x) A(x + 1) (8x)A(x):
(x1 of 11] states that short addition is possible using successor induction. Assume m > n: 0 < x + 1 is provable, and therefore 0 < f1g m?n is provable. From this we obtain the desired result by short addition.)
